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ingly recognizes important policy goals and realities as a justification for overriding outmoded
property-law limitations.  Commercial law should recognize the importance of reducing the wealth
gap as a justification for allowing the poor to use their de facto rights in property as collateral.
That not only would help to empower the poor with credit but also would facilitate sustainable
finance that attracts arm’s-length funding to supplement charitable and public resources.
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INTRODUCTION
The shrinking middle class and the widening gap between the rich and
the poor threaten social and financial stability.1  The World Economic
Forum,2 the United Nations,3 and recent surveys4 have identified this wealth
inequality as one of the greatest risks to the global community.  The noted
economist Hernando de Soto explains how the inability of the poor to obtain
credit increases this inequality.5
1 See, e.g., R.A., How Inequality Affects Growth, ECONOMIST (June 15, 2015), https://
www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-11 (discuss-
ing “recent work suggest[ing] that inequality [in wealth] could lead to economic or finan-
cial instability”).
2 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2014, NINTH EDITION 13–14 (2014).
3 G.A. Res. 70/1, at 14 (Sept. 25, 2015) (positing that the most important goal of the
international community should be to “[e]nd poverty in all its forms everywhere”).
4 See, e.g., Michelle Ma, How to Fix the World, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-fix-the-world-11548070200 (reporting the results of a reader
survey identifying the “vanishing middle class” in the global economy as the top issue that
“should be government and business leaders’ first priority”).
5 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 18–22 (2000).  Although de Soto’s
argument and its implications for transforming informal housing to formal title have
become a cornerstone of many development programs, some empirical analyses have ques-
tioned the impact of policies based on his argument. See, e.g., Timothy Mitchell, The Work
of Economics: How a Discipline Makes Its World, 46 EUR. J. SOC. 297, 309 (2005) (discussing the
criticisms).  Nonetheless, the connection between property rights and access to credit
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The poor hold their resources in defective form, de Soto argues.6  They
live in houses built on land that, de facto, is theirs but not legally recorded as
their property.7  As a result, they often cannot use their homes as collateral to
borrow and create wealth—mortgage lending being the primary source of
capital used to start small businesses.8  Others more recently have confirmed
that without the ability to borrow by using their homes as collateral, the poor
are “unable to leverage their resources to create wealth, and their assets
become ‘dead capital’ which cannot be used to generate income or growth.”9
This is both a U.S. and a worldwide problem.  Members of rural African
American communities, for example, commonly lack registered title to their
land.10  They therefore “cannot use the land as collateral for home mort-
gages or farming loans.”11  Recent efforts in Puerto Rico to obtain U.S. gov-
ernment assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria revealed that over
half of that island’s residents “lack title” to their houses.12
remains a central tenet of the current efforts to alleviate poverty. See, e.g., PEER STEIN,
TONY GOLAND & ROBERT SCHIFF, TWO TRILLION AND COUNTING 1, 9 (2010).
6 DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 19.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Chris Arsenault, Property Rights for World’s Poor Could Unlock Trillions in ‘Dead Capital’:
Economist, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-landrights-
desoto/property-rights-for-worlds-poor-could-unlock-trillions-in-dead-capital-economist-id
USKCN10C1C1; see also, e.g., STEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.  The poor also hold other
assets that cannot currently be used as collateral due to legal constraints. See, e.g., Hey-
wood Fleisig, Secured Transactions: The Power of Collateral, FIN. & DEV., June 1996, at 44.  For
example, legal constraints prevent movable property, such as cattle, from being used as
collateral by farmers in countries like Uruguay, whereas cattle are one of the best forms of
collateral in the United States. Id. at 45.  Merchants in developing countries who would be
willing to extend credit to poor farmers also may be legally constrained from taking inven-
tory or accounts receivable as collateral. Id. at 45–46.
10 Janice F. Dyer, Statutory Impacts of Heir Property: An Examination of Appellate
and Macon County Court Cases 2 (unpublished paper presented at the 66th Annual Pro-
fessional Agricultural Workers Conference, Tuskegee University, Dec. 7–9, 2008), http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.569.1533&rep=rep1&typepdf; see also
Joan Flocks, Sean P. Lynch II & Andre´a M. Szabo, The Disproportionate Impact of Heirs’ Prop-
erty in Florida’s Low-Income Communities of Color, 92 FLA. B.J. 57, 57 (2018) (observing that as
a result of intestate succession creating multiple fractional interests in real estate, heirs
have clouded title to their homes; and also finding that “this problem is especially preva-
lent in the southeastern United States” and “disproportionately affect[s] African-American
households, particularly in low-income communities”); Lizzie Presser, The Dispossessed, NEW
YORKER, July 22, 2019, at 28, 28 (quoting the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s characteriza-
tion of heirs’ property as “the leading cause of Black involuntary land loss,” and estimating
that heirs’ property “make[s] up more than a third of Southern black-owned land—3.5
million acres, worth more than twenty-eight billion dollars”).
11 Dyer, supra note 10, at 3; see also Flocks et al., supra note 10, at 57 (finding that
African Americans in low-income communities, especially in southeastern United States,
cannot use their land as collateral).
12 Adrian Florido, Unable to Prove They Own Their Homes, Puerto Ricans Denied FEMA
Help, NPR (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/20/595240841/unable-to-
prove-they-own-their-homes-puerto-ricans-denied-fema-help (reporting that “the island’s
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More broadly, the World Bank estimates that, largely due to poverty,
seventy percent of the world’s population lacks registered title to their
land.13  As the U.S. experience shows, this is a problem even for developed
countries.14  In Canada, for example, the indigenous First Nations people
hold interests in their land that “may not be immediately registerable under”
land title statutes, making those interests unmarketable and unable to be
used as collateral.15
The inability of the poor to use their homes as collateral to borrow and
create wealth poses an important challenge: Should the law recognize de
facto rights—that is, rights that are recognized or respected in practice but
not formally under (official) law16—to enable the poor and other economi-
cally disadvantaged people (collectively, the “economically disadvantaged”)
to use their homes and other commonly held assets as collateral, to obtain
credit?  Ending poverty requires bridging this “credit gap.”17  Credit is essen-
tial to economic growth and upward mobility:
Suppose you live in a medieval town that suffers from annual outbreaks
of dysentery.  You resolve to find a cure.  You need funding to set up a work-
shop, buy medicinal herbs and exotic chemicals, pay assistants and travel to
consult with famous doctors.  You also need money to feed yourself and your
family while you are busy with your research. . . .
. . . But how can you get the money when . . . all your time is taken up
with research?  Reluctantly, you go back to tilling your field, dysentery keeps
tormenting the townsfolk, [and] nobody tries to develop new remedies . . . .
That’s how the economy languished and science stood still.
The cycle was eventually broken in the modern age thanks to people’s
growing trust in the future, and the resulting miracle of credit.18
The efforts to date to meet this challenge have failed because they focus
on trying to transform de facto rights into de jure title under property law.19
government estimates that more than half of houses here are ‘informal’—meaning they
. . . lack title”).
13 Why Secure Land Rights Matter, WORLD BANK (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/feature/2017/03/24/why-secure-land-rights-matter.  The World Bank
observed that, in many parts of the world, people simply do not know what their property
rights are and, even if they try to find out, they cannot receive accurate information from
government agencies. Id.
14 See id. (stating that in the Republic of Macedonia, for example, only one-third of the
apartments had registered title).
15 John Borrows, Aboriginal Title and Private Property, 71 SUP. CT. L. REV. 91, 115–16
(2015).
16 See Legal English: “De Facto/De Jure,” WASH. U. ST. LOUIS (Dec. 28, 2012), https://
onlinelaw.wustl.edu/blog/legal-english-de-factode-jure/ (observing that “de facto refers to
situations that are true for practical reasons, whereas de jure refers to formal, official status
of the matter”).
17 STEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2, 9.
18 YUVAL NOAH HARARI, HOMO DEUS 203–04 (HarperCollins 2017) (2015).
19 Cf. Manny Jules, Foreword to TOM FLANAGAN, CHRISTOPHER ALCANTARA & ANDRE´ LE
DRESSAY, BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT, at xi (2010) (“To fully realize the full value of our land
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Property law is difficult to transform, however, being tightly bound to tradi-
tion and protecting vested ownership.20  Weak or conflicting property-law
regimes can also impede transformation, as evidenced by certain failed prop-
erty-titling programs.21  Leading scholars also explain the failure by observ-
ing that, “[i]ronically, property titling programs might actually reduce banks’
ability to foreclose [thus undermining their willingness to extend credit]
because [such programs] unavoidably send the message that governments
will side with poor borrowers in enforcing credit contracts.”22
This Article meets the challenge by taking an innovative but balanced
approach: focusing on using commercial law, rather than property law, to
enable the economically disadvantaged to use their de facto rights as collat-
eral to obtain credit.23  That use of commercial law, this Article shows, would
be consistent with modern principles of commercial law, which increasingly
recognize important policy goals and commercial realities as a basis to over-
ride outmoded limitations imposed by property law.  It also would be eco-
nomically efficient, fair to vested owners, and easy to implement.
Enabling the economically disadvantaged to use their rights as collateral
to obtain credit would also create an important new source of “sustainable
finance,” a term that encompasses financial innovations that benefit both the
private sector and society at large.24  Virtually all existing forms of sustainable
we need a secure property-rights system.”); Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property
Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 406
(2008) (arguing that collateral is not effective unless the borrower has “secure ownership
of the property” that constitutes the collateral); infra notes 155–66 and accompanying text
(discussing the limitations of property-titling programs intended to encourage banks to
extend credit to economically disadvantaged borrowers).
20 See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Hernando de Soto and the Histories of Property Law, in HER-
NANDO DE SOTO AND PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 51, 52 (D. Benjamin Barros ed.,
2010) (explaining that despite the United States’ occasional recognition of squatters’ infor-
mal property rights, “property law in the United States was then—and continues today—to
be primarily about the protection of vested rights”); cf. GLEN SEAN COULTHARD, RED SKIN,
WHITE MASKS 74–75 (2014) (observing that a proposal by indigenous tribes in Canada,
which would have transformed the Northwest Territories into an indigenous-based prop-
erty system, was “interpreted as violating what many northerners had come to consider an
‘inalienable right’ to own property”).
21 See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
22 Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the
Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program 24 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished
paper), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/field/files/fieldtorerocs.pdf.
23 Absent that recognition, the economically disadvantaged will remain unable to bor-
row. See, e.g., STAFF OF H.R. SELECT COMM. ON HUNGER, 100TH CONG., ACCESS AND AVAILA-
BILITY OF CREDIT TO THE POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. 1 (Comm. Print
1987) (finding that collateral requirements imposed by financial institutions prevent the
poor from gaining access to credit); Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 19, at 406–07.
24 Thomas Clarke & Martijn Boersma, Sustainable Finance? A Critical Analysis of the Regu-
lation, Policies, Strategies, Implementation and Reporting on Sustainability in International Finance
4–5 (United Nations Env’t Programme, Working Paper 16/03, 2016) (discussing sustaina-
ble finance from a broader environmental, social, and governance perspective).
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finance depend on charitable or public sources of funding,25 which are lim-
ited and unreliable,26 or on mandatory regulation of finance to impose social
responsibility.27  In contrast, this Article’s new vision of sustainable finance is
designed to attract arm’s-length commercial funding sources.28
This new vision is also consistent with government efforts to mobilize
private-sector finance for sustainable growth.  The European Union, for
example, recognizes that because “the scale of the [sustainable growth]
investment challenge is beyond the capacity of the public sector alone,” the
private “financial sector has a key role to play in reaching those goals.”29  To
try to facilitate that role, the EU recently adopted an action plan on sustaina-
ble finance that included the objective of “reorient[ing] capital flows towards
sustainable investment in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive
growth.”30  This Article would squarely meet that objective.31
25 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for Commercially Sus-
tainable Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (“Historically, the majority of
microfinance activities had been confined to the on-lending of funds provided by charita-
ble donors . . . .”).  This Article’s vision of recognizing de facto rights to collateralize credit
is also fundamentally different from the credit provided by microfinance, which does not
rely on collateral: “Micro-credit does not rely on the borrower’s title to his or (more fre-
quently) her assets as collateral or as a source of repayment to the lender.  It relies on the
borrower’s appreciation of the importance of the loan and corresponding willingness to
repay it.”  Boris Kozolchyk, Secured Lending and Its Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J.
727, 731 (2007).
26 See Schwarcz, supra note 25, at 1167–68 (“[T]he need for microfinance lending
vastly exceeds the amount of funds that can be raised from charitable donors.  It is esti-
mated, for example, that of the 1.5 billion people potentially eligible for microfinance
loans, only 100 million people—less than 7%—receive them.” (footnote omitted)); cf.
infra note 29 and accompanying text (finding that the sustainable growth investment chal-
lenge is beyond the capacity of the public sector).
27 Clarke & Boersma, supra note 24, at 4.
28 See infra Section II.D (explaining why lenders would be prepared to extend credit).
29 Sustainable Finance, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-econ-
omy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance_en (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).  To this
end, the European Commission established a High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable
Finance in December 2016, with a mandate to “steer the flow of public and private capital
towards sustainable investments.” Id.  That Group concluded that it will be important to
“look[ ] into regulatory changes to mobilise the significant funding capacity of private capi-
tal.”  Valdis Dombrovskis (Vice President for the Euro and Social Dialogue) & Jyrki
Katainen (Vice President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness), Foreword to
EU High-Level Expert Grp. on Sustainable Fin., Financing a Sustainable European Economy, at
2 (2018).
30 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament et al., Action Plan: Financ-
ing Sustainable Growth, § 1, COM (2018) 97 final (Mar. 8, 2018).
31 The EU’s action plan contemplates the possibility of making regulatory changes,
focusing on recalibrating bank capital requirements to take into account risks arising from
unsustainability. Id. § 3.3.  Capital requirements, however, are highly intrusive and socially
costly.  They can cut into global economic output and job growth by reducing bank lend-
ing and creating a credit shortfall. See, e.g., Jean Dermine, Bank Regulations After the Global
Financial Crisis: Good Intentions and Unintended Evil, 19 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 658, 661–62 (2013)
(“Or, if capital is excessive, it might lead to inefficiently higher interest rates on bank
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This Article proceeds as follows.  To underpin the normative analysis,
Part I explains how and why commercial law currently overrides property law.
This approach follows the strong scholarly precedent for grafting a norma-
tive legal inquiry onto positive-law reality.32  Part II then explains how and
why commercial law should override property law to enable the economically
disadvantaged to use their de facto rights as collateral to obtain credit.
Thereafter, Part III explains why overriding property law in that way would be
economically efficient, generating benefits that exceed its costs.  Part IV of
this Article examines how to implement this legal framework, comparing stat-
utory and judicial approaches.  Finally, the Annex to this Article proposes the
text of a model law that could form the basis of a statutory approach (the
“Model Law”).
I. EXPLAINING HOW AND WHY COMMERCIAL LAW OVERRIDES PROPERTY LAW
  Commercial law increasingly recognizes important policy goals and com-
mercial realities as a basis to override certain property-law limitations.33
Although there are many examples,34 the dominant precedent is the Uni-
loans . . . .  [I]n a dynamic perspective, private costs may induce social costs as banks
reduce their supply of loans or securitise assets.”); Jacob A. Bikker & Haixia Hu, Cyclical
Patterns in Profits, Provisioning and Lending of Banks and Procyclicality of the New Basel Capital
Requirements, 55 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO QUART. REV. 143, 144 (2002) (arguing that
capital requirements might reduce bank lending, thereby causing a credit shortfall that
would harm the public); Reint Gropp et al., Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements:
Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment 1 (Halle Inst. for Econ. Research, IWH Discussion
Paper No. 33, 2016), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/148361/1/874406
994.pdf (finding that higher bank capital requirements cause banks to increase their capi-
tal ratios “not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply,” result-
ing in lower firm, investment, and sales growth).  This Article’s legal solution is more
highly targeted—focusing on changing commercial law to enable the poor to use their de
facto rights as collateral in order to start small businesses.
32 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1988) (grafting a normative analysis of bankruptcy law (what should
be “the best method for dividing the [corporate] reorganization pie”) onto a positive
assumption about that law (taking as given the widespread use of the corporate reorganiza-
tion alternative to liquidation)); cf. Noel Annan, Introduction to ISAIAH BERLIN, PERSONAL
IMPRESSIONS, at xv, xxi (Henry Hardy ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (1980) (arguing that
norms are and should be factually based and tethered to reality).
33 By observing that commercial law sometimes “overrides” property law in those cir-
cumstances, I am not making a general normative claim about relationships between com-
mercial law and property law or among those bodies of law and contract law.  Rather, I am
simply observing that legislatures sometimes enact provisions of commercial law that, by
their terms, explicitly override property law. See infra notes 34 & 40–52 and accompanying
text (discussing statutory provisions of commercial law that override property law in the
United States, Germany, Japan, and Chile).
34 Many nations’ commercial law recognizes policy goals and commercial realities as a
basis to override outmoded limitations imposed by property law.  In Germany, for exam-
ple, a “bona fide acquirer may obtain the ownership of a chattel under certain circum-
stances [even when] the transferor is neither the owner of the chattel nor authorized by
the owner to dispose thereof.” Karsten Thorn, Germany, in TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP IN
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form Commercial Code (UCC), perhaps the world’s most respected codifica-
tion of commercial law.35  The UCC is a model law that is promulgated and
continuously updated by the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law
Commission.  The American Law Institute, with worldwide membership, is
“the leading independent organization in the United States producing schol-
arly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law.”36  The Uni-
form Law Commission provides “non-partisan, well-conceived and well-
drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state stat-
utory law.”37  This Article builds on the foundation provided by the
UCC,38 among other sources.39
The UCC overrides property law in order to recognize important com-
mercial realities that clash with the “arbitrary shifting” of rights based on
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 203, 211 (Alexander von Ziegler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011); see also
BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 932, para. 1, translation at http://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (Ger.) (allowing good-faith
acquirers of property to obtain ownership of chattel); BGB, § 892, translation at http://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html (presuming accuracy of the con-
tents of land registry); HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], § 366, para. 1
(applying these provisions of the civil code to commercial transactions in some circum-
stances).  The justification is that it is often unreasonable or even impossible for the
acquirer to verify the property relations before transaction.  This “result is accepted in
order to sustain trade and commerce” even though it “effectively leads to an expropriation
of [property of] the owner.”  Thorn, supra, at 211.  Japan’s commercial law is similar.
Tomotaka Fujita, Japan, in TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra, at 261,
264 (recognizing that one who acquires “the possession of movables peacefully and openly
by a transactional act acquires rights” in such movables if he is in “good faith and without
fault”) (quoting MINPO [MINPO] [CIV. C.] art. 192 (Japan)).  Chile goes even further, recog-
nizing that the “social function of . . . ownership” makes ownership subordinate to require-
ments of “the Nation, the national security, the public utility and health and the
preservation of the environment.”  Luis Felipe Lira Guzma´n & Herna´n A. Pitto, Chile, in
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra, at 83, 90 (citing CONSTITUCIO´N
POLI´TICA DE LA REPU´BLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19).
35 Cf. Roy Goode, The Codification of Commercial Law, 14 MONASH U. L. REV. 135, 137
(1988) (describing the Uniform Commercial Code as the “most ambitious codification of
commercial law ever attempted in any jurisdiction”).
36 About ALI, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
37 Overview, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/over-
view (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
38 The UCC applies to security interests in personal property but not real estate.
U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).  The real estate exclu-
sion, however, is due to self-interested lobbying by the real estate bar. See, e.g., Robert K.
Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REV. 1097,
1112–13 (2002) (observing that local real-estate bars preferred non-UCC lack of uniformity
for rent-seeking purposes, requiring the hiring of local lawyers for real property transac-
tions and creating an entry barrier for out-of-state lawyers seeking bar admission).  Because
the UCC’s innovative principles—such as the disentanglement of commercial and prop-
erty law—are compelling and should logically apply regardless of whether the property at
issue is personal or real estate, this Article’s analysis does not distinguish that nature of the
collateral except as specifically indicated. Cf. infra Annex, Model Law art. 1(1) (stating
that such Law applies to security interests in both personal property and real property).
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property.40  For example, UCC § 9-202 provides, with very limited excep-
tions, that “the provisions of this article [9] with regard to rights and obliga-
tions apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.”41
This enables commercial law to recognize the reality that “[t]he retention or
reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery
to the buyer . . . is limited in effect to a reservation of a ‘security interest.’”42
That recognition “provides a clearer and more coherent system for dealing
with . . . conflicts” over competing rights.43
Similarly, UCC § 2-401 provides (again, with very limited exceptions)
that each “provision of this Article [2] with regard to the rights, obligations
and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties
applies irrespective of title to the goods.”44  This enables commercial law to
recognize the reality that the risk of losing goods in shipment should be allo-
cated to the party who “control[s] the goods and can be expected to insure
his interest in them,”45 whether or not that party owns the goods at the time
of their loss.46  Commercial law’s recognition of that reality is widely touted
as providing “enormous” gains “in clarity, translatability and practicability.”47
It has also become the basis for allocating risk of loss under the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).48
39 Cf. supra note 34 (providing examples of non-UCC commercial law that likewise
recognizes policy goals and commercial realities as a basis to override property-law
limitations).
40 U.C.C. § 2-509 cmt. 1 (observing that the “underlying theory” is to avoid “an arbi-
trary shifting of the risk with the ‘property’ in the goods”).  The UCC itself does not yet
clearly embrace the recognition of de facto rights as a basis to grant a security interest. See
id. § 9-203(b)(2) & cmt. 6 (requiring the debtor to have “rights in the collateral” as a
condition of granting a security interest therein, but not discussing whether de facto rights
might suffice). But cf. Michael Bridge & Jo Braithwaite, Private Law and Financial Crises, 13
J. CORP. L. STUD. 361, 397 (2013) (discussing how conflating contract and property in
derivatives transactions in insolvency can jeopardize financial stability).
41 U.C.C. § 9-202.
42 Id. § 1-201(b)(35) (defining a security interest).
43 Sean Thomas, The Role of Authorization in Title Conflicts Involving Retention of Title
Clauses: Some American Lessons, 43 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 29, 30 (2014).
44 U.C.C. § 2-401.
45 Id. § 2-509 cmt. 3.
46 See id. § 2-509.
47 John Honnold, The New Uniform Law for International Sales and the UCC: A Comparison,
18 INT’L LAW. 21, 27 (1984).  Recognition of reality strongly influences the UCC. See
Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2124 (2012)
(“In drafting the Uniform Commercial Code, Llewellyn set out to diminish the importance
of title, a decision fully justified according to the Realist-inspired conventional wisdom.”).
48 See Honnold, supra note 47, at 27 (discussing the CISG’s rules in articles 66–70 for
allocating risk of loss and observing that “rules on risk of loss are closely patterned on the
modern rules of the UCC.  The approach is the same: the elusive concept of property . . . is
not employed.  Instead, the Convention’s rules are drafted in terms of concrete commer-
cial events—handing over goods to the carrier and the buyer’s ‘taking over’ physical pos-
session from the seller.” (footnote omitted)).
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The UCC also overrides property law to recognize important policy
goals.  For example, to facilitate the transferability of goods, it gives good-
faith purchasers greater rights in the transferred goods than the seller itself
had.49  This recognizes that buying goods (such as a computer) from a store
would be prohibitively expensive if, to protect the purchase, the purchaser
had to perform due diligence on whether the store actually owned the com-
puter and whether the computer might be encumbered by any third-party
rights.  Similarly, to facilitate the transferability of negotiable instruments
that substitute for money, such as promissory notes, the UCC gives holders in
due course (essentially, good-faith purchasers of those instruments)50 greater
rights in the transferred instruments than the seller itself had.51  This recog-
nizes that it would be prohibitively expensive to use instruments—just as it
would be prohibitively expensive to use money—as a medium of exchange
and measure of value if one had to perform due diligence on whether the
transferor actually owned the instrument (or the money, as the case may be)
and whether the instrument (or the money) might be encumbered by any
third-party rights or subject to any defenses.52
II. EXPLAINING WHY COMMERCIAL LAW SHOULD OVERRIDE PROPERTY LAW
TO EMPOWER THE POOR
Commercial law thus recognizes important policy goals and commercial
realities as bases for overriding property-law limitations.  By that measure,
commercial law should also override those limitations to enable the economi-
cally disadvantaged to pledge de facto rights in their homes and other assets
as collateral to obtain credit.  The ability to pledge those rights would achieve
an important policy goal: “unlocking the entrepreneurial potential of billions
of people.”53  It also would facilitate an important commercial reality:
allowing de facto rights holders to gainfully use property that de jure owners
are not using (and do not intend to use).54
There is, however, another justification for enabling the economically
disadvantaged to pledge de facto rights in their homes and other assets as
collateral55: de facto rights are real rights, though not formally recognized.56
49 See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing holders in due course of
instruments and buyers in ordinary course of goods).
50 See infra note 69.
51 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
52 See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 269, 279 (2016) (“American courts, it would appear, came to recognize the undue
burden that a rule of no title would place on good faith purchasers by relegating to them
the costs of investigating title during each transaction, thereby impeding the efficient func-
tioning of markets.”).
53 Arsenault, supra note 9.
54 I restrict this Article’s application to property as to which the de jure owners fail to
provide clear notice to preserve their rights. See infra note 92 and accompanying text; see
also infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(3).
55 Yet another justification for overriding property law is that the law should correct
market failures. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756
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Property law nonetheless implicitly recognizes de facto rights through its view
of property as a “bundle of entitlements regulating relations among persons
concerning a valued resource.”57  This bundle-of-entitlements—sometimes
called a bundle-of-sticks—conception of property law reveals that a property
right can be more complex than simple “ownership” of property.
For example, rights in property may include the right to use, the right to
exclude use, and the right to transfer,58 and different persons can have dif-
ferent rights in the same property.59  The economically disadvantaged often
have the right to use the property where they live and, arguably, also to
exclude use of that property by others.60  These rights are de facto because
they are respected in practice but not formally under (official) law.61  The
economically disadvantaged also have the de facto right to transfer their use
and exclusion rights, at least to family members such as children.62
In order to turn these de facto rights into collateralized credit, the eco-
nomically disadvantaged would also need to be able to transfer security inter-
ests in that property to lenders as collateral for loans.  Given their de facto
(15th ed. 1995).  Property law itself arguably creates a market failure by enabling the de
jure owner to abandon using the property commercially while preventing the de facto
right holder from using it.
56 Professor Paulus observes that, in medieval times, jurists already recognized a dis-
tinction between de jure rights, called dominium directum, and de facto rights, called domin-
ium utile. See E-mail from Christoph Paulus, Professor of Law, Humboldt Univ. of Berlin, to
Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Bus. Duke Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr.
20, 2018) (on file with author).
57 Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 871
(2013).
58 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, at
xxxiv (7th ed. 2017).
59 See id. at 665.  For example, person A may have title to Blackacre.  Through an
easement, person B may gain the right to use person A’s land, while not having the right to
exclude A or even a stranger, person C.  To that extent, person B has a “real” property
right. See id. at 534 (describing a nonexclusive easement in which a grantor has reserved
the right to use the easement in conjunction with the grantee, as well as the ability to sell
further rights to others).
60 See, e.g., KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 52
(2003) (citing Botswana as a country where individuals have the right to exclude others
from land even though formal title is held by the state or community); Bui Quoc Toan et
al., Vietnam: Customary Land Tenure Study 9 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 37417, 2004),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/855721468174546190/Vietnam-customary-
land-tenure-study (observing that de facto land owners in Vietnam have a restricted right
to exclude others).
61 See Legal English: “De Facto/De Jure,” supra note 16 and accompanying text (defining
de facto rights).
62 See Coˆng Ba´o Nos 1011-1012 [Land Law], No. 45/2013/QH13 (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/vie167592.pdf (describing the ability to transfer and
inherit land-use rights in Vietnam); DEININGER, supra note 60, at 31 (noting that most cus-
tomary systems have inheritable rights to cropland); LANEY ZHANG, LAW LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, CHINA: REAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2015) (describing the ability to transfer land-use
rights in China).
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right to transfer their use and exclusion rights to related parties,63 enabling
the economically disadvantaged to transfer security interests in those rights
to obtain credit should be a trivial additional step—certainly justified by its
benefits.64
However, lenders almost certainly would require another step that is far
from trivial: transferring a security interest in the underlying de jure rights in
the property.  This reflects the practical reality that they are unlikely to
extend credit unless, in a foreclosure, they can obtain the full rights—both
de facto and de jure—in the property pledged as collateral.65
This poses a puzzle: a borrower that has only de facto rights in that prop-
erty cannot normally pledge greater rights.  This reflects the longstanding
property-law principle of “nemo dat”66—the concept that one cannot transfer
more rights than one owns.  How could holders of de facto rights also trans-
fer the de jure rights?
This Article next attempts to solve that puzzle, examining when commer-
cial law should modify property law’s nemo dat restriction.  Thereafter, this
Article addresses other questions that would be raised by turning de facto
rights into collateralized credit, including whether recognizing de facto
rights would be unfair to holders of de jure rights, whether the de facto
rights could be clearly identified, and—assuming satisfactory answers to the
foregoing questions—whether lenders would be prepared to extend, and the
economically disadvantaged would be prepared to accept, credit.
A. How Could Holders of De Facto Rights Transfer More Rights than They Hold?
Commercial law already addresses this conundrum.  To facilitate the sale
of goods, commercial law gives buyers of goods, in the ordinary course of
business,67 full unencumbered rights to those goods.68  Similarly, to facilitate
63 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (discussing these benefits).
65 Absent foreclosure, ownership of the underlying de jure rights in the property
would be unaffected because the security interest terminates once the loan is repaid. See
U.C.C § 9-513 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (requiring the secured party to
file public notice that its security interest has terminated once the underlying obligation
has been satisfied).  Even in a foreclosure, the owner of those underlying de jure rights
would retain any surplus value in the property not needed to repay the lender. See id. § 9-
615(d)(1) (providing for the return of such surplus value to the property owner).
66 The phrase, more precisely, is nemo dat quod non habet.  There is also a parallel
phrase, nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet (no one can transfer more rights than
he himself has).
67 A buyer of goods in the ordinary course of business is conceptually similar to a
holder in due course of negotiable instruments.  Both effectively include a person who
purchases goods, or receives the transfer of such an instrument, for value, in good faith,
and without knowledge that the purchase or transfer violates the rights of another person.
Compare id. § 1-201(9) (defining buyer in ordinary course), with id. § 3-302(a) (defining
holder in due course).
68 See, e.g., id. § 9-320 (providing that a buyer of goods in ordinary course of business
takes free of a security interest created by the seller of the goods, even if the buyer knows of
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the transferability of negotiable instruments, commercial law gives holders in
due course full unencumbered rights to these transferred instruments.69  If
commercial law did not override property law in these ways, the transaction
costs of selling goods and negotiating instruments would be prohibitive.  As
mentioned, one could not buy a computer from a store without performing
due diligence to ensure the seller’s ownership and the absence of third-party
encumbrances,70 and one could not use instruments as a medium of
exchange without performing due diligence on whether the transferor actu-
ally owned the instrument and whether the instrument might be encum-
bered by any third-party rights or subject to any defenses.71
These “bona fide purchaser” exceptions from nemo dat epitomize com-
mercial law’s recognition of important policy goals and commercial realities
as bases for overriding property law’s limitations.  But should access to collat-
eralized credit justify another exception to nemo dat, enabling the economi-
cally disadvantaged to pledge not only their de facto rights but also the
underlying de jure rights?  In answering this question, one should realize that
although nemo dat is a “common sense” rule,72 one of the world’s leading
property-law scholars observes that “[o]ne could imagine all sorts of different
rules, based on the relative qualities of [competing parties], to determine
who had the better title—their virtue, their need, and so on.”73  Moreover, in
practice, and without any overarching theory,74 “exceptions to nemo dat apply
often, if not most of the time.”75
Taking into account common sense and practicality, this Article pro-
poses the following answer: the critical benefits provided by access to collater-
the security interest’s existence); id. § 2-403(2) (“Any entrusting of possession of goods to
a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives [the merchant] power to transfer all
rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.”).
69 See id. § 3-305(b) (providing that the right of a holder in due course to enforce the
obligation of a party to pay an instrument is not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(2) or claims in recoupment stated in subsection (a)(3) against a person
other than the holder). Compare id., with supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
72 Smith, supra note 47, at 2120.
73 Id. at 2120–21.  Smith is the Fessenden Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
74 See id. at 2122 (“[It] is easier to describe as a set of exceptions to nemo dat than as a
set of freestanding rules with a freestanding nemo dat rule alongside them.”).
75 Id. at 2121.  Professor Kochan similarly describes exceptions to nemo dat as a practi-
cal compromise:
Whereas strict adherence to nemo dat might be theorized as the “first-best”
solution to fraudulent and recurrent land conveyances and best at adhering to
our formalistic tendencies, the realities of property make that solution less than
satisfactory and make exceptions justifiable.  We have accepted pragmatically that
exceptions must be made and that we may have to, in essence, validate fraud at
times.
Donald J. Kochan, Dealing with Dirty Deeds: Matching Nemo dat Preferences with Property Law
Pragmatism, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
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alized credit76 should justify another exception to nemo dat that would enable
the economically disadvantaged to transfer as collateral the underlying de
jure rights as well as their de facto rights—if doing so is not unfair to holders
of those underlying rights.  This Article next examines whether recognition
of that transfer would be unfair to holders of those underlying rights.
B. Would Recognition of That Transfer Be Unfair to Holders of De Jure Rights?
Commercial law constantly grapples with conflicting rights and the need
for fairness.  Questions of balancing rights and fairness arise when giving
holders in due course unencumbered rights to transferred negotiable instru-
ments, and also when giving buyers of goods in the ordinary course of busi-
ness unencumbered rights to those goods.77  The answers to these questions
inform how rights and fairness should be balanced in the context of this
Article’s proposal to recognize de facto rights.
A holder in due course can receive the transfer of an encumbered
instrument—even one that is already subject to third-party rights, such as a
lien—effectively free and clear of the encumbrance.78  The implicit fairness
rationale is that the party with the original encumbrance could have pre-
served its rights by providing clear notice of those rights to subsequent trans-
ferees.79  Similarly, a buyer of goods in the ordinary course of business can
purchase the goods free and clear of an existing encumbrance and can even
purchase full title to goods from a seller with only limited title.80  Again, the
implicit fairness rationale is that the party with the original encumbrance or
title could have preserved its rights by providing clear notice of those rights
to subsequent transferees.81
76 These benefits include unlocking the entrepreneurial potential of billions of peo-
ple, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, recognizing the important commercial real-
ity that the de jure owner is not using the property whereas the economically
disadvantaged may be motivated to use it, see supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text,
and more generally reducing poverty and facilitating upward mobility.
77 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
78 See U.C.C. § 9-330(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (providing that
such a transferee of an instrument “has priority over a security interest in the instrument
perfected by a method other than possession”).
79 See id. § 9-330 cmt. 7.  An additional fairness rationale is that the party with the
original encumbrance may also have a claim for losses against the transferor. See, e.g.,
Gregory E. Maggs, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine as a Default Rule, 32 GA. L. REV. 783,
786–87 (1998) (arguing that a maker of a promissory note should be able to sue the note’s
payee for selling defective furniture; instead, the maker had to pay the note in full after it
was transferred to a holder in due course).  As a rough parallel, this Article suggests giving
holders of underlying de jure rights a profit-sharing upside potential in the business
started by the borrower. See infra note 91.
80 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
81 The Official Comments to UCC § 9-320 clarify, for example, that a buyer purchases
goods subject to a security interest if the buyer is informed that its purchase is intended to
be so encumbered.  U.C.C. § 9-320 cmt. 3.  And if a buyer purchasing goods entrusted to a
merchant is informed that the merchant’s right to sell the goods is limited, the buyer
would not be a “buyer in the ordinary course” for purposes of UCC § 2-403. Id. § 2-403(2).
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Providing clear notice to preserve original rights also has precedent in
the somewhat parallel tension between the de jure rights of landowners and
the de facto rights of squatters.  In many jurisdictions, squatters can ulti-
mately obtain superior rights over the land they occupy under the law of
adverse possession.82  Having its roots in the English common-law rule of
disseisin, adverse possession enables a trespasser to acquire imperfect posses-
sory rights that could, over time, become perfect legal title if the trespasser’s
use of the land is “open and notorious”83 and the owner does not act to
prevent the trespasser.84
The requirements that the trespasser’s use of the land be open and noto-
rious and that the owner does not act to prevent the trespasser are grounded
in reality.  The “open and notorious” requirement takes into account not
only whether the trespasser’s use is effectively permanent (such as living
long-term in a home, as opposed to occasionally picking berries) but also
whether such use effectively provides reasonable notice to the owner, ena-
bling the owner to object before losing its land.85  Courts also consider who
the community believes owns the land.86  The owner-does-not-act require-
ment enables an owner to preserve its rights by providing explicit notifica-
tions, such as posting “no trespassing” signs, locking doors, and blocking
entry to the land.87
Because an additional fairness rationale is that the party with the original encumbrance or
title encumbrance may also have a claim for losses against the seller of the goods, this
Article again suggests, as a rough parallel, giving holders of underlying de jure rights a
profit-sharing upside potential. Compare supra note 79 (describing the fairness rationale
that the party with the original encumbrance can recover losses against the transferor),
with infra note 91 (suggesting holders of the underlying de jure rights could have the right
to receive a specified percentage of profits, for a specified period, from the business started
by the de facto owner).
82 See EDUARDO MOISE´S PEN˜ALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUAT-
TERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 60–61 (2010) (explaining
how adverse possession, among other laws, has been used to give squatters formal property
rights over absentee owners); see also SINGER ET AL., supra note 58, at 104 (observing that
the government often granted formal property rights in the United States to individuals
squatting on public land). But cf. id. at 309 (discussing recently passed state statutes
restricting adverse possession).
83 SINGER ET AL., supra note 58, at 294.  In the United States, adverse possession law is
state law, not federal law.  The majority of U.S. states require a trespasser to prove with
clear and convincing evidence (1) “actual possession” for (2) a statutory period (different
for each state), that is (3) open and notorious, (4) adverse and hostile, (5) continuous,
and (6) exclusive. Id. at 293.
84 See, e.g., Lee J. Alston et al., De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and
Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15264, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15264 (dis-
cussing, among other things, how adverse possession has allowed squatters to transform
their occupation into legal title).
85 SINGER ET AL., supra note 58, at 294.
86 See id. at 314–15.
87 Id. at 294–96.
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Adverse possession recognizes that a person who has used certain land
for a long time may have settled expectations, and that the de jure landowner
may have forgotten about or essentially abandoned the land.88  Protecting de
jure rights might then give the landowner a windfall and inflict a huge loss
on the land user.  Adverse possession thus can promote the effective utiliza-
tion of land and also can reduce transaction costs by preventing litigation
over “stale” claims to land, such as a claim by a supposed owner from decades
ago.89
Applying this same type of approach to collateralized credit should simi-
larly respect fairness90 while helping to promote the effective utilization of
property.91  The original de jure rights holders would be required to provide
clear notice to preserve their rights.  To avoid doubt and protect de facto
rights holders, any such notice should be physically obvious and manifestly
clear.  It might include, for example, posting “no trespassing” signs, locking
doors, and/or blocking entry or access to property.92  It should not include
88 Id. at 313–15.
89 See id. at 310–11.
90 Cf. Kochan, supra note 75, at 4, 52–60 (advocating an “inquiry notice” approach to
give original owners “additional opportunities to protect their title interests”).  A legal pro-
cess that respects fairness while promoting the effective utilization of property should also
be respected under laws that protect private property.  For example, Protocol 1 to the
European Convention on Human Rights states:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his posses-
sions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest . . . .
Eur. Conv. on Human Rights, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, C.E.T.S. 009 (protection of property).
91 To help balance the risk that they could lose their rights in a foreclosure, holders of
the underlying de jure rights could receive a profit-sharing upside potential in the business
started by the borrower, such as the right to receive a specified percentage of profits, for a
specified period, from the business started by the de facto owner.  A profit-sharing upside
would also be consistent with the concept of corrective justice, which requires a person to
repair losses that his conduct causes even if the person is not morally to blame for the
losses. Theories of the Common Law of Torts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 3.1, https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/#CorJus (last updated Dec. 17, 2015) (discussing
corrective justice theory); cf. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 439 (1990) (arguing that ideal corrective justice
should not be subject to a causation requirement; a person who increases the risk of harm
occurring should be liable, period).
92 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(3) (enabling de jure rights holders to provide
clear notice to preserve their rights). Compare infra Annex, Model Law art. 3(2) (defining
“clear notice”), with supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing clear notice in the
context of adverse possession law).
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notices posted by mail or distributed electronically or through the media.93
Furthermore, no such notice should impair the right of economically disad-
vantaged persons to continue living on or using property.94
One might question whether allowing de jure rights holders to give clear
notice to preserve their rights could effectively prevent the disadvantaged
from obtaining credit: Wouldn’t reasonable de jure rights holders always give
such notice, thereby preventing foreclosure on their property (and thus
effectively preventing it from being used as collateral)?  In answer, relatively
few de jure rights holders likely know of their rights; it is unclear who, other
than the government,95 owns much of the property in which the disadvan-
taged hold de facto rights.96
That itself raises the question of whether it is fair to impair property
rights of persons who are unaware they hold such rights.  At least in partial
answer, the law has a long tradition of cutting off such rights, epitomized not
only by adverse possession law,97 but also by escheatment law, which treats
property as abandoned if the owner is unknown or cannot be located.98  Fur-
thermore, the government itself appears to own a significant portion of the
93 The clear-notice requirement raises a practical problem that could be caused by
physical deterioration of the notice or even by economically disadvantaged persons inten-
tionally removing signs, unlocking doors, or otherwise unblocking entry or access to prop-
erty prior to granting a security interest.  To attempt to balance interests, Article 4(3) of
the Model Law provides, in part, that the grant of a security interest in de facto rights shall
not include a security interest in the underlying de jure rights if, at any time within the
ninety-day period prior to the grant of a security interest in such de facto rights, there
exists clear notice of the intent of the owner of the underlying de jure rights to preserve
such de jure rights. Infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(3).  Thus, if a “no trespassing” sign
blows away or is removed thirty days prior to the grant of a security interest in such de facto
rights, the owner of the underlying de jure rights remains protected.  But if a “no trespass-
ing” sign blows away or is removed ninety-one days prior to the grant of a security interest
in such de facto rights, the security interest also attaches to the underlying de jure rights.
The owner of the underlying de jure rights could protect those rights by monitoring the
property at least every ninety days.
94 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(4) (providing that notices shall not otherwise
impair de facto rights).
95 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
96 See Why Secure Land Rights Matter, supra note 13 (referencing a World Bank study
discussing the uncertainties associated with property rights); cf. Borrows, supra note 15, at
100 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding aboriginal title and property rights in
Canada); Martin E. Gold & Russell B. Zuckerman, Indonesian Land Rights and Development,
28 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 41, 47, 53–56 (2014) (finding that the majority of land in Indonesia
is not formally registered); Honduras, USAID, https://land-links.org/country-profile/hon-
duras/#land (last updated Apr. 2011) (“Approximately 80% of the privately held land in
the country is untitled or improperly titled.  Only 14% of Hondurans legally occupy
properties and, of the properties held legally, only 30% are registered.”).
97 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing adverse possession law,
which recognizes that the de jure landowner may have forgotten about or essentially aban-
doned the land and also seeks to prevent litigation over stale claims).
98 See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Escheat § 12 (2007).
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property in which the disadvantaged hold de facto rights.99  To that extent,
the question of fairness would be less critical, devolving instead into a politi-
cal issue.  This Article suggests that the government should subordinate its de
jure rights to the rights of the economically disadvantaged.100
One also might ask whether an alternative to this Article’s proposal
should be to extend adverse possession law more widely.101  Adverse posses-
sion law, however, is much more onerous to de jure rights holders because it
deprives them of title outright, not merely in the event of a lender foreclo-
sure.102  Moreover, unlike adverse possession, this Article’s proposal encour-
ages, and indeed is effectively conditioned on,103 the economically
disadvantaged borrowing to start small businesses,104 which would bring
important economic and social benefits.105  Extending adverse possession
law would therefore be a poor alternative.
99 See, e.g., LIZ ALDEN WILY, Rights to Resources in Crisis: Reviewing the Fate of Customary
Tenure in Africa, Brief #1 of 5, in CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN THE MODERN WORLD: RIGHTS
TO RESOURCES IN CRISIS 1 (2011), http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/
RightsToResourcesInCrisis.Compiled_ENGLISH.pdf.  Wily finds that the landholding sta-
tus of forests, rangelands, marshlands, and other uncultivated lands in Africa is often
regarded by the government “as un-owned public lands or state property.” Id.  She also
finds that this type of landholding status represents a “major tenure system on a worldwide
scale” and “is not confined to Africa.” Id. at 2; cf. HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND
TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18 (Alain Durand-Lasserve &
Lauren Royston eds., 2002) (“In a large number of sub-Saharan African countries . . . the
land is owned and managed by the state . . . .”); Robin Mearns, Access to Land in Rural India:
Policy Issues and Options 27 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2123, 1999)
(“In rural India, some of the most important village commons include community forests,
pasture or ‘wasteland’, river banks, river beds, ponds and tanks.  Forest department land
may also form de facto commons, whether or not local inhabitants have legal rights to its
products.  In total, commons may account for around 20 percent of India’s total land
area.”).
100 See infra Annex, Model Law arts. 4(2)–(3), 8 (providing that government-owned
property is subject to foreclosure).
101 Several commentators have asked this question. See, e.g., Sally Brown Richardson,
Abandonment and Adverse Possession, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1385, 1385–86 (2015).
102 See supra note 65 (observing that, absent foreclosure, ownership of the underlying
de jure rights in the property would be unaffected because the security interest terminates
once the loan is repaid; and that even in a foreclosure, the owner of those underlying de
jure rights would retain any surplus value in the property not needed to repay the lender).
103 See infra note 137 and accompanying text (observing that although this Article gen-
erally contemplates that loan proceeds be used to start a small business, the Model Law
does not strictly mandate that use; this flexibility recognizes that prudent borrowers will
want to use the loan proceeds to generate wealth and prudent lenders will condition lend-
ing on that use).
104 There are other differences, possibly less significant.  For example, adverse posses-
sion law applies primarily to real estate.  Also, this Article’s proposal, unlike adverse posses-
sion, contemplates the possibility of profit sharing. See supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
105 See infra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
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C. How Could the De Facto Rights Be Clearly Identified?
This question is perhaps the most difficult in practice.  To satisfy lenders
and create credit, commercial law must clearly define and identify de facto
rights in collateral.  However, existing real estate recording systems identify
only de jure rights, and they tend to use metes and bounds or other parame-
ters for identification that might not always be practical for describing de
facto rights.106
De Soto addressed this question by arguing that economically disadvan-
taged people have developed their own ways of determining who owns what,
as part of “extralegal social contracts,” and that any reform should be based
on—or at least rooted in—these behavioral norms and customs.107  When
traveling through Indonesian rice paddies, he observed to government offi-
cials that there was no clear way of knowing where one farmer’s land ended
and another’s began, but “the dogs knew.”108  “Every time [he] crossed from
one farm to another, a different dog barked.  Those Indonesian dogs may
have been ignorant of formal law, but they were positive about which assets
their masters controlled,” and thus “[b]y traveling their city streets . . . and
listening to the barking dogs, [the officials] could gradually work upward . . .
until they made contact with the ruling social contract.”109
One of the Indonesian officials characterized this as “Jukum Adat,” the
people’s law.110  A people’s-law approach actually has strong commercial-law
precedent.  For example, UCC § 1-303 recognizes course of performance111
and course of dealing.112  “A course of performance or course of dealing
between the parties . . . is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties’
106 See, e.g., SINGER ET AL., supra note 58, at 950–51 (describing three methods used to
identify real property boundaries in deeds: metes and bounds, government surveys, and
plats); DAVID C. LING & WAYNE R. ARCHER, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES: A VALUE APPROACH
59–65 (4th ed. 2013) (describing three legal methods used to measure property bounda-
ries: metes and bounds, subdivision plat and block number, and government rectangular
survey).  Metes measures land by indicating the distance (and sometimes the compass bear-
ing) between specified points. Id. at 59.  Bounds measures land by its position relative to
known landmarks, such as streams, walls, or roads. Id.; see also WALTER G. ROBILLARD &
DONALD A. WILSON, BROWN’S BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 86–94 (7th ed.
2014).
107 DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 134–41.
108 Id. at 128.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 A “course of performance” is a “sequence of conduct between the parties to a partic-
ular transaction that exists if” the following are true:
(1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves repeated
occasions for performance by a party; and
(2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and oppor-
tunity for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it without
objection.
U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
112 A “course of dealing” is a “sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions
between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
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agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement,
and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.”113
The practical problem, though, is that a people’s-law or similar
approach might not sufficiently identify the collateral to satisfy lenders.  The
challenge is to adequately identify the collateral without generating prohibi-
tively high transaction costs.  Technology affords at least one way to accom-
plish that.  Either the government, a nongovernmental organization (NGO),
or in some cases perhaps a local neighborhood association could organize
the residents to allocate their de facto property rights by setting flags or other
visible markers at the boundaries.114  Satellite, drone, or other overhead
imagery could then document that for translation into an accurate and easily
ascertainable description of those allocated boundaries.115  The law would
respect that allocation if it followed a prescribed methodology,116 which—for
the reasons discussed below117—need not conform to the jurisdiction’s
existing mortgage-recording system.118  The allocation would be transcribed
to a government record that lenders could search.119
The commercial-law distinction between the clarity needed to create a
security interest and the clarity needed to perfect that interest helps to
explain why this approach would provide sufficient clarity at low transaction
costs.  Creating a security interest requires a reasonably identifiable descrip-
tion of the collateral because it effects the transfer of that interest from a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.” Id.
§ 1-303(b).
113 Id. § 1-303(d).
114 See Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 19, at 457–58 (noting that the Republic of Came-
roon’s title process involved state agents placing concrete boundary markers on farmers’
land).
115 This might be done, for example, using GPS. See Victor Neene & Monde Kabemba,
Development of a Mobile GIS Property Mapping Application Using Mobile Cloud Computing, 8 INT’L
J. ADVANCED COMPUTER SCI. & APPLICATIONS 57, 57–65 (2017) (providing examples of using
current technologies to map properties and explaining how to develop and use a mobile
property mapping application).  The costs associated with doing this could be borne by
governments or NGOs or collectively by local communities.  Although it is a political issue,
some developed nations that maintain satellites might be willing to absorb the cost of satel-
lite imagery.
116 See, e.g., infra Annex, Model Law art. 5(2)–(3) (discussing reasonable methods for
describing collateral).
117 See infra notes 121–30 and accompanying text.
118 Any disagreement about a boundary between de facto rights could be resolved at
the local level. See, e.g., Gold & Zuckerman, supra note 96, at 61 (observing that the major-
ity of land disputes in Indonesia are resolved locally by the village head, who applies cus-
tom as modified by Sharia law); Mastewal Yami & Katherine A. Snyder, After All, Land
Belongs to the State: Examining the Benefits of Land Registration for Smallholders in Ethiopia, 27
LAND DEGRADATION & DEV. 465, 473–74 (2016) (observing that complaint-handling com-
mittees, village elders, and religious leaders work together in Ethiopia to resolve disputes
over land boundaries that cannot be resolved by land administration officials).
119 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 5(4) (respecting allocations that follow prescribed
methodologies).
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debtor to a secured creditor.120  This Article’s approach reasonably identifies
the collateral in two steps: first, recognizing the de facto rights collectively;
second, recognizing an allocation of those rights that follows the relevant
prescribed methodology.121
That methodology need not conform to the jurisdiction’s existing mort-
gage-recording system.  The primary purpose of a mortgage-recording system
is to give notice to third parties, not necessarily to allocate rights between a
debtor (mortgagor) and secured creditor (mortgagee).122  Whether the col-
lateral is real estate or personal property, the debtor and secured creditor
need only clearly identify the collateral as between themselves.123
Much less clarity is needed, in contrast, to perfect a security interest—a
step often required under law to put third parties on notice that property
may be encumbered as collateral.124  For real estate, perfection normally
involves describing the collateral in a mortgage-recording system.125
Although mortgage-recording descriptions often specifically identify the col-
lateral by official government surveys or metes and bounds,126 the descrip-
tion need not be that specific.  Because the agreement creating the security
interest provides the specificity,127 perfection only requires notice to third
parties that property might be subject to a security interest.128  A description
120 See U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (“[A] description
of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identi-
fies what is described.”).  This description is normally included in the security agreement
that creates the security interest. See id. § 9-201(a) (“[A] security agreement is effective
according to its terms between the parties . . . .”).
121 See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
122 Cf. SINGER ET AL., supra note 58, at 995–96 (explaining that lenders use mortgage-
recording systems “to understand and give notice to others of their security interest in the
property”).
123 Dale A. Whitman, What You Didn’t Know About Real Estate Recording Acts, ABA SEC-
TION REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. EREPORT (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/rpte_ereport/2016%20eReport/6-November%202016/
What%20You%20Didn_t%20Know%20about%20Recording%20Acts_Whitman%20(2)
.pdf.
124 The rationale for perfection is that notice avoids misleading third parties.  Amy
Loftsgordon, What Does It Mean to Perfect a Lien?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-ency-
clopedia/what-does-mean-perfect-lien.html (last visited Jun. 5, 2018) (stating that the
recording required to perfect a mortgage serves to give other parties notice of the lien).
An encumbrance on property that is not disclosed is often condemned as a “secret lien.”
Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 256
(2009).
125 See Lori Anne Czepiel et al., Lending and Taking Security in the United States: Overview,
THOMSON REUTERS, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-501-2871?transition-
Type=Default&contextData=(Sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 (last updated Mar. 1,
2018).
126 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., JOHN MIRKOVIC, BLOCKCHAIN PILOT PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 9, 21 (2017),
http://cookrecorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Report-CCRD-Blockchain-
Pilot-Program-for-web.pdf (“The State of Illinois does not have a legal requirement that
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of collateral is sufficient for perfection if it merely “provides notice that a
person may have a security interest in the collateral claimed.”129  This mini-
mal description requirement reduces transaction costs.130
In principle, this approach should enable a lender to perfect its security
interest in allocated de facto rights by filing a standard description of the
broader de jure rights in the applicable mortgage-recording system.  That
description might even be a copy of the existing recorded description of
those rights.131  It would not need to actually redescribe those allocated
rights using metes and bounds or other mortgage-recording parameters.132
D. Would Lenders Be Prepared to Extend Credit?
Assuming satisfactory answers to the foregoing questions, would banks
and other lenders actually extend credit to economically disadvantaged bor-
rowers, based primarily on collateral?  Being a practical question, this can
only be answered empirically based on what lenders actually do.133  Nonethe-
less, the following observations may inform the answer.
deeds and conveyancing instruments be recorded in a Recorder’s Office and, thus, record-
ing a deed does not increase or enhance the validity of the conveyance. . . . The ultimate
purpose of recording an instrument is not to validate the conveyance or make the convey-
ance ‘more legal,’ but instead is to provide notice . . . .”).
129 U.C.C. § 9-504 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).  For that reason,
a financing statement is sufficient to describe the collateral if it simply provides an indica-
tion that it covers “all assets or all personal property.” Id. § 9-504(2). Compare id. § 9-
308(a) (providing that “a security interest is perfected if it has attached and all of the
applicable requirements for perfection in Sections 9-310 through 9-316 have been satis-
fied”), with id. § 9-310(a) (stating the general rule that “a financing statement must be filed
to perfect all security interests”).
130 Other provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code also work to reduce transaction
costs. See, e.g., id. § 9-310(c) (“If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest . . . , a
filing under this article is not required to continue the perfected status of the security
interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.”).  The logic is that
the original notice filing should be sufficient to inform third parties that the collateral may
be encumbered. See also Peter F. Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code
and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including “Notice Filing,” 47 IOWA L. REV. 289, 293
(1962) (“If the easier methods of [notice] filing are intelligently used, the [Uniform Com-
mercial] Code will make a great contribution toward simplifying security transactions.”).
131 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 7(2) (allowing that description).
132 Adverse possession law similarly resolves conflicts between de facto owners by using
criteria other than metes and bounds. See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 82–83
(1996) (explaining that “squatter 1” must have openly acted as the owner to succeed in a
land claim over “squatter 2”); H.L. Burgoyne, Title by Adverse Possession, 6 LAW. & BANKER &
S. BENCH & B. REV. 197, 199–200 (1913) (explaining that the element of actual possession
in a claim for adverse possession is typically determined by evidence of ownership in rela-
tion to the disputed land, such as residence on the land, the erection of buildings, or
fencing, clearing, or cultivating the land).
133 I later examine potentially informative empirical data on how property-titling pro-
grams affect the willingness of banks to extend credit to economically disadvantaged bor-
rowers. See infra notes 155–67 and accompanying text.
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Bank lending traditionally has focused on “two ways out,” such as asset
value and cash flow, as dual means of repaying the loan.134  With the resur-
gence of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and other leveraged acquisition-of-con-
trol financing, banks have sometimes shifted their focus more on asset value
as the repayment source.135  The key is that the loans be sufficiently overcol-
lateralized—that their collateral value exceed the amount of the loan by a
reasonable margin, enabling repayment in the event of a default.136
This Article’s concept of extending credit to economically disadvantaged
borrowers would follow that pattern: the lenders would look primarily to the
collateral.  Although their potential second way out would be the profits of
small businesses started with the proceeds of their loans,137 small business
start-ups have a high failure rate.138  Prudent lenders therefore would insist,
as indicated above,139 that their loans be sufficiently overcollateralized.140
Abuses leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007–08 have created
uncertainty, however, for asset-based lending to economically disadvantaged
borrowers.  Lenders made massive amounts of so-called “subprime” mortgage
134 Cf. Mark Carey et al., Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ?
Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting, 53 J. FIN. 845, 850–51, 851 n.2 (1998)
(observing that banks can be asset-based lenders and cash-flow-based lenders); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1924–47 (1994) (recognizing
two types of unsecured lending: asset-based unsecured lending and cash-flow-based
unsecured lending).
135 See, e.g., Appendix H—Glossary, FED. BANKING L. REP., 2015 WL 6277290 (observing
that for loans made to finance “takeovers, leveraged buyouts and restructurings,”
“[a]ssurance of interest and principal payments in the future is limited; repayment often
depends on asset sales rather than the ongoing profitability of the business”).  Lending for
breakup or bust-up LBOs depends almost entirely on the target company’s sales of its
assets for repayment. See Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged
Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (1987).
136 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1093 (2018) (“‘[L]oans that are not initially overcollateralized
are inherently risky, given that a decline (or even a plateau) in collateral’ value could
jeopardize repayment.” (quoting Steven L. Schwarcz & Lucy Chang, Essay, The Custom-to-
Failure Cycle, 62 DUKE L.J. 767, 784 (2012))).  In the context of pledging de facto rights as
collateral, prudent lending would require the value of that collateral to exceed the amount
of the loan by some reasonable margin.
137 The Model Law does not mandate that the loan proceeds must be used to start a
small business.  Although this Article generally contemplates that use, omitting such a
mandate gives borrowers and lenders case-by-case flexibility to negotiate how loan pro-
ceeds could be used—implicitly trusting that prudent borrowers will want to use the pro-
ceeds to generate wealth and that prudent lenders will condition lending on that use.  As
appropriate, a lender always has the right to include a use-of-proceeds clause requiring a
specific use of the loan proceeds.
138 See infra note 183.
139 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140 A prudent lender also would want to document that the borrower is economically
disadvantaged at the time of making the loan, to ensure that the security interest in the
underlying de jure rights is enforceable.  Article 4(5) of the Model Law provides a safe
harbor for this determination. See infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(5).
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loans to such borrowers, depending entirely on the expectation of housing-
price appreciation—and subsequent refinancing—for repayment.141  Many
of the world’s most sophisticated financial institutions invested billions of
dollars in mortgage-backed securities that were payable from collections on
these subprime mortgage loans.142  When housing prices failed to appreci-
ate, and in many regions began to depreciate, these lenders and investors
suffered huge losses.143  As a result, subprime asset-based loans are perceived
as inherently risky.144
In reality, though, whether subprime asset-based loans are actually risky
depends on the extent of overcollateralization.  Prudent asset-based lending
should never have to depend—as subprime mortgage lenders depended
prior to the financial crisis145—on the expectation of collateral appreciation
for overcollateralization.  Instead, prudent subprime asset-based loans should
be adequately overcollateralized when they are made.146  In contrast to
precrisis subprime mortgage lending, this Article’s vision of extending credit
should meet that prudence standard.
The reason why precrisis subprime mortgage lending failed that stan-
dard—whereas extending credit to economically disadvantaged borrowers
secured by their de facto rights should meet it—turns on basic principles of
purchase-money lending.  A subprime mortgage loan is a type of purchase-
money loan in which a lender advances funds to an economically disadvan-
taged borrower to purchase a home and pledges the home as collateral for
the loan.147  Because economically disadvantaged borrowers rarely have
money to make a down payment, the amount of the loan usually must equal
141 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES 165 (2011) (stating that many of the subprime mortgage products “would
perform only if [housing] prices continued to rise and the borrower could refinance at a
low rate”).
142 See id. at xvi (“When the [housing] bubble burst, hundreds of billions of dollars in
losses in mortgages and mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial insti-
tutions that had significant exposures to those mortgages and had borrowed heavily
against them.”).
143 Id. at 213–15, 227–28.
144 Cf. SINGER ET AL., supra note 58, at 968–69 (discussing the federal and state laws
passed after the financial crisis to regulate subprime mortgage lending (and thus avoid
risky lending practices)).
145 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
146 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 390 (2008) (explaining why prudent subprime
asset-based lending would require a minimum level of overcollateralization).
147 See, e.g., Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1848, 1849 (2011); Purchase Money Mortgage, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/purchase_money_mortgage (last visited June 10, 2018)
(defining purchase-money mortgage).
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the purchase price of the home.148  The loan therefore is not overcollateral-
ized when made; it depends on an expectation of home appreciation for
overcollateralization.149
In contrast, loans made to economically disadvantaged borrowers
secured by their de facto rights, as contemplated by this Article, are not
purchase-money loans.  The borrower already has those de facto rights.  A
lender would extend credit based on its valuation of the collateral, with pru-
dent lenders insisting on overcollateralization.  To illustrate, say a prospective
borrower resides on property valued by the lender at $100,000 and would like
to borrow $100,000.  No prudent lender would make such a loan.  A lender
might counter, however, with an offer to lend $75,000 secured by that collat-
eral—providing significant overcollateralization.150  The prudent lending
standard thus will restrict the relative amount an economically disadvantaged
person could borrow against his de facto rights.  Nonetheless, that amount
may well be sufficient to start a viable small business.
If needed, this Article’s proposal for borrowing based on de facto collat-
eral rights could be supplemented to induce lenders to advance higher
amounts.  For example, some communities might consider providing cross-
guarantees of repayment, which is typical in microfinance lending.151  Those
guarantees would constitute a second source of repayment, and thus would
justify a higher advance rate.152  Governmental or multigovernmental enti-
ties might also consider helping to partially or fully guarantee loans in order
148 See, e.g., Megan Elliott, Can’t Afford a 20% Down Payment? 6 Ways You Can Buy a
Home, SHOWBIZ CHEAT SHEET (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.cheatsheet.com/money-
career/cant-afford-20-percent-down-payment-ways-you-can-buy-a-home.html/?a=viewall.
149 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
150 As an industry custom, mortgage lenders often measure overcollateralization by the
loan-to-value ratio (LTV). See, e.g., CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & JOSEPH R. MASON, HIGH LOAN-
TO-VALUE MORTGAGE LENDING 25 (1999) (noting that collateral, measured by LTV, is one
of the “three Cs” critical to mortgage lending).  In the example in the text above, the LTV
would be seventy-five percent (i.e., $75,000 loan divided by $100,000 collateral value).
151 See Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice, supra note 25, at 1192.  Some of the cultural
factors that are important for microfinance may also be worth considering. Cf. Kozolchyk,
supra note 25, at 737–40 (arguing that credit also depends on having cultural values that
recognize a borrower’s duties toward his or her creditors).
152 As discussed previously, bank lending generally recognizes two ways of repaying a
loan: asset value and cash flow. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing two
ways out); cf. Meng Miao & Oren Sussman, Financial Distress, Contract Enforcement and
Asset Grabbing: An Investigation of Repossession Reform in China (July 29, 2019) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the importance of third-party loan
guarantees in China, where secured collateral is weak).
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to attract private credit,153 or even making loans directly from public
resources.154
Finally, it can be informative to examine the empirical studies on how
property-titling programs affect the willingness of banks to extend credit to
economically disadvantaged borrowers.  After surveying these studies for the
U.S. Agency for International Development, an agricultural economist con-
cluded that “[w]hile land titling can help to expand access to credit in some
circumstances and can be an important part of a poverty reduction strat-
egy,”155 “in most developing world environments, the ability to leverage a
title for credit is limited for a variety of reasons.”156  Because titling programs
can inadvertently undermine the willingness to extend credit,157 one should
interpret that conclusion cautiously.  Nonetheless, the “variety of reasons”
the survey gives to explain why a titling program may be limited in expanding
access to credit can help to inform this Article.
153 Many governmental and multigovernmental organizations have been making these
types of guarantees. See, e.g., Guarantees Program, WORLD BANK, http://
www.worldbank.org/en/programs/guarantees-program (last visited Sep. 8, 2019) (stating
that an important aim of its Guarantee Program is to “[m]obilize private investment
(equity and debt) for strategic projects or sector support”); Medium and Long-Term Loan
Guarantee, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK U.S., https://www.exim.gov/what-we-do/loan-guarantee
(last visited Sep. 8, 2019) (stating that the EXIM Bank provides loan guarantees to help
companies “secure competitive financing for [their] international buyers” on competitive
terms otherwise unavailable to such buyers); World Bank Guarantees in Action, WORLD BANK
(Feb. 9, 2018), http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/guarantees-program/brief/
world-bank-guarantees-new-project-briefs (detailing “how World Bank guarantees mobilize
commercial financing for investment projects, help restructure expensive debt of utilities,
and increase developing countries’ access to capital markets”); see also RAUNDI HALVORSON-
QUEVEDO & MARIANA MIRABILE, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GUARANTEES FOR
DEVELOPMENT 2 (2014) (“Developmental guarantees are a valuable instrument for mobilis-
ing private resources—be they from private companies, banks, individuals, NGOs, self-help
groups, investment funds, etc.  For a fraction of the potential cost of the risk exposure
undertaken, considerable liquid resources can be deployed for investments to improve
economic and social conditions . . . .”).
154 For example, the U.S. government offers several types of direct loans, including
small business loans. See Government Grants and Loans, USAGOV, https://www.usa.gov/
grants#item-37017 (last updated Mar. 25, 2019).  As appropriate, lenders and guarantors
might consider negotiating, as a quid pro quo, some profit sharing with borrowers whose
businesses ultimately become successful. See supra note 91 (discussing a profit-sharing
upside potential to help balance the risk that holders could lose their underlying de jure
rights in a foreclosure).
155 JOLYNE SANJAK, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., LAND TITLING AND CREDIT ACCESS—
UNDERSTANDING THE REALITY 1, 3 & n.7 (2012), https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/Land-Titling-and-Credit-Access-Understanding-the-Reality.pdf (citing
research that empirically shows that “titling significantly improved farmer access to
credit”).
156 Id. at 1.
157 Cf. supra note 22 and accompanying text (arguing that titling programs send the
message that governments will side with poor borrowers in enforcing repayment).
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One reason the survey gives is that some of the titling occurred in juris-
dictions that lacked private-sector lenders.158  To remedy this, governmental
or multigovernmental entities should consider extending credit if private-sec-
tor sources are unavailable.159  This Article’s Model Law provides that
option.160  Another reason given is that the transaction costs of taking collat-
eral to secure relatively small loans can make lending unprofitable.161  To
remedy this, economically disadvantaged borrowers should have the right to
borrow on a joint-and-several basis, pooling their collateral.  The Model Law
provides this right.162  This right would be especially useful, for example,
where multiple borrowers join together to collectively start a business.163  Yet
another reason explaining the limit is possible legal uncertainty whether the
titling program adequately grants property rights.164  The Model Law would
eliminate that uncertainty because it operates by directly granting collateral
and foreclosure rights.165  The last reason explaining the limit is possible
legal uncertainty about the validity and enforceability (including the right to
foreclose) of the lenders’ security interests in collateral.166  Again, the Model
158 See SANJAK, supra note 155, at 6 (discussing studies that attribute limitations of land
titling to provide access to credit to the fact that “formal credit . . . markets do not exist in
the survey area” and to “the scarcity of formal credit sources in the survey areas” (quoting
Anne-Sophie Brasselle et al., Land Tenure Security and Investment Incentives: Puzzling Evidence
from Burkina Faso, 67 J. DEV. ECON. 373, 400–01 (2002)).
159 See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text (discussing possible financial assis-
tance from governmental or multigovernmental entities).
160 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 10.
161 See SANJAK, supra note 155, at 2 (observing that “the assets that these households
have are too small in value . . . making the costs to a lender in doing business with such
clients unjustified”).  The value of these assets, however, is becoming substantial. See, e.g.,
Guiliander Carpes, A House in a Favela Can Cost R$700,000 (US$313,000), RIOONWATCH
(Harriet Batey trans., July 18, 2013), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=10452; M. Raj-
shekhar, Great Rural Land Rush: 3 to 100-Fold Rise in Farm Land Prices May Not Bode Well,
ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/great-
rural-land-rush-3-to-100-fold-rise-in-farm-land-prices-may-not-bode-well/articleshow/
25607513.cms (last updated Nov. 12, 2013) (reporting on the skyrocketing price of farm-
land in rural India).
162 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(6).
163 Lending to the poor on a joint-and-several basis has significant precedent in
microfinance. See, e.g., Jon Einar Flatnes & Michael Carter, A Little Skin in the
Microfinance Game: Reducing Moral Hazard in Joint Liability Group Lending Through a
Mandatory Collateral Requirement 2 (May 25, 2016) (unpublished paper prepared for
presentation at the 2016 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association Annual Meeting),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/236157/files/A_little_skin_in_the_microfinance_
game_-_Flatnes_Carter-AAEA_submission.pdf (observing joint lending’s popularity in
microfinance).
164 See SANJAK, supra note 155, at 3–6 (observing that land titling alone may be insuffi-
cient in some jurisdictions to establish property rights).
165 See infra Annex, Model Law art. 8 (governing foreclosure).
166 See SANJAK, supra note 155, at 7 (discussing studies that find the need for “a legal
framework for secured transactions to use those assets as collateral for loans” and also
observing possible limits on “pledging or enforcement of pledges upon default”).
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Law would eliminate that uncertainty by directly granting collateral and fore-
closure rights.167
E. Would the Poor Be Willing to Borrow?
After struggling to empower the economically disadvantaged with credit,
this question may seem anticlimactic.  However, people tend to be risk
averse.168  A person who lives on land (or otherwise uses property) may be
unwilling to risk losing it in a foreclosure, even if taking that risk brings the
chance to start a successful small business.169  Because around half of start-up
businesses fail,170 the risk is significant.
This Article does not purport to reliably predict how many economically
disadvantaged persons would be willing to turn their de facto rights into col-
lateralized credit.171  It merely observes that people invest their lifesavings
into small businesses all the time,172 and that the ability to use other people’s
(i.e., the de jure rights holders) property rights as collateral might even cre-
167 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  Another possible reason explaining the
limit might be uncertainty about the practical enforceability of the lenders’ security inter-
ests. See SANJAK, supra note 155, at 5 (“[S]ocial issues [may] limit pledging or enforcement
of pledges upon default.”).  Any such uncertainty would likely be confronted and
addressed by a jurisdiction in its process of enacting the Model Law.
168 See, e.g., Ruixun Zhang et al., The Origin of Risk Aversion, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 17777, 17777 (2014) (“Risk aversion is one of the most fundamental properties of
human behavior.”).
169 See DEAN KARLAN ET AL., FIN. ACCESS INITIATIVE, TAKE-UP: WHY MICROFINANCE TAKE-
UP RATES ARE LOW & WHY IT MATTERS 10 tbl.3 (2010) (noting that the low microloan take-
up rate can be partially attributed to half of eligible borrowers not wanting to go into
debt); Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 19, at 407 (observing that even with the ability to
collateralize loans, economically disadvantaged parties who are “risk-averse and perceive a
risk of losing their land if it is mortgaged” might not borrow).  Risk aversion would likely
be even greater for loans that have recourse to the borrower if the collateral is insufficient.
Cf. GREGERS NYTOFT RASMUSSEN, PATIENCE, RISK AVERSION, AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15
(2018), https://static-curis.ku.dk/portal/files/192466266/Ph.D.190.pdf (finding that bor-
rower risk aversion is high in Denmark because “all mortgage loans are recourse, which
implies that it is not possible to strategically default on a mortgage by walking away from
the property,” so “[t]he debt follows the borrower, and he remains liable to repay the
potential deficiency after a foreclosure auction”).
170 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
171 Any such prediction would almost certainly require field research in the communi-
ties of holders of de facto rights.  Even then, there are differences in what people say they
will do and what they actually do in untested scenarios. See, e.g., Ana Villar, Response Bias,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 751, 751–52 (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008)
(observing that response bias can lead to flawed survey results).
172 Cf. Asheesh Advani, Tapping Your Personal Savings to Fund Your Startup, ENTREPRE-
NEUR (June 5, 2006), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/159522 (“[T]he most popu-
lar source of startup financing is the personal savings of the business’s founder.”); Martin
Zwilling, Top 10 Sources of Funding for Start-ups, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2010), https://
www.forbes.com/2010/02/12/funding-for-startups-entrepreneurs-finance-zwilling.html
#577f89ae160f (discussing personal savings as the number one preferred source of funding
start-up companies).
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ate an overincentive to borrow.173  Moreover, if necessary to motivate the
economically disadvantaged to borrow, governments could consider subsi-
dizing the resulting businesses or providing back-up housing as a safety net
for borrowers whose businesses fail.174
III. EXPLAINING WHY OVERRIDING PROPERTY LAW TO EMPOWER THE POOR
WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT
This Article has explained from a legal standpoint how and why com-
mercial law should override property law to enable the economically disad-
vantaged to use their homes and other commonly held assets as collateral.
Such a legal change, however, would have broad policy ramifications.  When
considering a change in law that has significant policy consequences, the
norm is to examine whether the benefits would justify the costs of the
change.175  Although referred to in a regulatory context as a cost-benefit
analysis, this is effectively a Kaldor-Hicks economic efficiency analysis.176
A project is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if its overall benefits exceed its overall
costs, regardless of who bears the costs and who gets the benefits.177  Section
III.A next estimates the anticipated benefits, and Section III.B then estimates
the anticipated costs of overriding property law to enable the economically
disadvantaged to use their homes and other commonly held assets as collat-
eral to obtain credit.  Section III.C thereafter balances those benefits and
costs.
A. Estimating Anticipated Benefits
The anticipated benefits of enabling the economically disadvantaged to
obtain credit are incalculably high.  Assuming the disadvantaged use it to
173 I later examine this over-incentive as a possible cost. See infra notes 186–91 and
accompanying text.
174 For example, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) offers loan guarantees,
a form of subsidy, of up to eighty-five percent for small business loans. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, WHAT IS THE SBA 7(A) LOAN GUARANTY PROGRAM? 1
(2015).  Governments worldwide likewise provide credit guarantees to stimulate small busi-
ness lending. See, e.g., SEAN CREEHAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., HOW DIGITAL INNOVA-
TION CAN INCREASE SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO FINANCE IN ASIA 4 (2018).  Governments
could also offer housing allowances to help the disadvantaged obtain back-up housing if a
loan default results in seizure of their land. Cf. E. Jay Howenstine, Foreign Housing Voucher
Systems: Evolution and Strategies, 109 MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1986, at 21, 27 (“In foreign
experience, the housing allowance has proved to be a highly flexible and versatile tool of
national policy.  Not only has it been an effective means for directly reducing excessive
rent burdens on low-income families . . . but it has also provided powerful support in
implementing other important national social and economic objectives.”).
175 See, e.g., ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT 190 (2004).
176 See id.; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Changing Law to Address Changing Markets: A Conse-
quence-Based Inquiry, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 167–68 (2017).  Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency is the practical standard used by economists to assess the economic desirability of a
project.
177 MALLOY, supra note 175, at 190.
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start small businesses, credit not only can greatly help to alleviate poverty but
also can foster economic development—thereby helping to strengthen both
social and financial stability.178  Economic development also has the secon-
dary benefit of creating additional jobs.  In the United States, for example,
the Small Business Administration (SBA) reported that its fiscal year 2016
loans to small businesses “supported more than 587,000 jobs.”179  The World
Bank similarly regards small businesses as important “drivers of local growth
and job creation” in low-income countries and also lists “support for small
and medium enterprises” as a “top priority in the global agenda.”180  That
priority includes improving access to credit, to reduce the estimated $5.2 tril-
lion financing gap that is frequently identified as a barrier to those enter-
prises’ growth.181
B. Estimating Anticipated Costs
The principal costs of overriding property law to enable the economi-
cally disadvantaged to obtain credit are threefold: direct harm to owners of
the underlying de jure rights, potential subversion of the rule of law, and the
loss of property by economically disadvantaged borrowers whose ventures
fail.  Additionally, there are transaction costs.  Consider each in turn.
Owners of the underlying de jure rights would be harmed if a lender
forecloses on, and thus obtains ownership of, their rights.182  Foreclosure
would occur only if the borrower defaults.  Ideally, borrowers who success-
fully invest the loan proceeds in small businesses should realize profits that
enable them to repay the loans, avoiding foreclosure.  Statistically, however,
178 Improved access to formal credit may also result in a lower reliance on informal
sources of credit for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  The World Bank has
recognized that financial inclusion and formalization of SMEs has the ancillary benefits of
higher tax revenues and better regulation. See Small and Medium Enterprises (SMES) Finance,
WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/smefinance (last visited Aug. 19,
2018).
179 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FY 2018 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND FY 2016
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 28.
180 Entrepreneurs and Small Businesses Spur Economic Growth and Create Jobs, WORLD BANK
(June 20, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/06/20/entrepre-
neurs-and-small-businesses-spur-economic-growth-and-create-jobs.  Small businesses con-
tribute to the global economy in myriad ways, including by injecting “competition into
previously stale areas,” “hiring local people,” and increasing business diversity “in form,
function, culture, and potential,” thereby making it “easier . . . for the economy to with-
stand tough conditions.”  Jose Vasquez, Why Are Small Businesses So Important for the Econ-
omy?, HUFFPOST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-are-small-
businesses-so-important-for-the-economy_b_58f61f9ae4b048372700db75.
181 Philippe Le Houe´rou, Foreword to MIRIAM BRUHN ET AL., INT’L FIN. CORP., MSME
FINANCE GAP: ASSESSMENT OF THE SHORTFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCING MICRO,
SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS, at vii (2017), https://
www.smefinanceforum.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Sites%20downloads/MSME%20
Report.pdf; BRUHN ET AL., supra, at ix.
182 Cf. infra Annex, Model Law arts. 4(2), 8(2) (giving foreclosing lenders the ability to
obtain full rights in the property pledged as collateral).
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around half of all small business start-ups fail.183  When a failure occurs, fore-
closure would harm the owner of the underlying de jure rights.  Although it
is hard to try to quantify this harm,184 it might reach hundreds of millions of
dollars or more.185  This harm might even be worse because the ability of the
economically disadvantaged to use de jure property rights as collateral theo-
retically creates an overincentive to borrow.186
Several factors, however, should mitigate these harms to owners of the
underlying de jure rights.  This Article proposes to enable such owners to
provide clear notice of their rights, thereby protecting those rights.187  Risk
aversion, including the fact that the economically disadvantaged would lose
their de facto interests in a foreclosure and thus have “skin in the game,”188
should mitigate the theoretical overincentive to borrow by aligning the
183 Matt Mansfield, Startup Statistics—The Numbers You Need to Know, SMALL BUS. TRENDS
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://smallbiztrends.com/2016/11/startup-statistics-small-busi-
ness.html; cf. Patricia Nilsson, London Start-ups are Most Likely to Fail, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 12,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/e3c745c4-88d8-11e7-afd2-74b8ecd34d3b (“London
has the lowest rate of start-up survival in the UK: only 50.1 per cent of companies formed
in 2013 endured for three years, 3.6 percentage points below the national average.”). But
see David Waring, Small Business Failure Rates: Why All the Stats Have It Wrong, FITSMALLBUSI-
NESS (July 26, 2017), https://fitsmallbusiness.com/small-business-failure-rates/ (criticizing
small business failure rates as inaccurately calculated).
184 Owners of the underlying de jure rights might also be harmed if their rights are
merely encumbered by a lender’s security interest, which would limit their practical ability
to transfer their rights or to use those rights as collateral to raise funding.  Although it is
even harder to try to quantify this harm, the fact that such owners tolerate or are unaware
of the economically disadvantaged using their property indicates that they have little (at
least current) interest in transferring their rights or using those rights as collateral to raise
funding. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (observing that relatively few de jure
rights holders likely know of their rights).
185 In contrast to the average microloan, which is between $100 and $1500, see, e.g.,
Matthew Swibel, Microfinance Fever, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2007), https://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2008/0107/050.html#1a26ce06bd145, the typical loan size under this Article’s pro-
posal is likely to be in the tens of thousands of dollars because de facto owners will be able
to pledge their land as collateral.  Even assuming a low lending rate due to risk aversion, see
supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text, a start-up failure rate of fifty percent, see supra
note 183 and accompanying text, suggests that de jure owners might lose property worth
hundreds of millions of dollars or more in the aggregate.
186 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  To illustrate this overincentive, say that
the value of full ownership—de facto and de jure—of a given property is $100,000, and
that Ignacio’s de facto ownership in that property can be valued at $50,000.  Assume Igna-
cio borrows $80,000, which he invests in a start-up business that is 50% likely to succeed,
resulting in a total value of $140,000, and 50% likely to fail, resulting in a total loss.  The
expected value of this project could be calculated as follows: EV = [50% chance of project
succeeding x $140,000 total value from that success] + [50% chance of project failing x $0
value from that failure] = $70,000.  That represents a loss compared to the $100,000 full
ownership value of the property but a gain compared to the $50,000 de facto ownership
value of the property.
187 See supra text accompanying notes 89–93. See generally infra Section II.B (examining
how recognizing de facto rights could be made fair to holders of de jure rights).
188 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
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incentives of the de jure rights holders and the disadvantaged.189  To help
ensure that this alignment of incentives is meaningful, the right to include
underlying de jure rights as collateral should exclude cases where the value
of the de facto rights is relatively insignificant.190  This Article’s suggestion to
give de jure rights holders a profit-sharing upside in the start-up businesses
would also help to align those incentives.191
The potential subversion of the rule of law represents a second principal
cost.  This cost, however, should be relatively modest.  As this Article dis-
cusses, commercial law already has set strong precedents for overriding prop-
erty law to achieve important policy goals and commercial realities.192
Furthermore, the law of adverse possession provides additional precedent for
favoring de facto rights over de jure rights in circumstances similar to those
discussed.193  Conceptually, overriding property law to enable the economi-
cally disadvantaged to obtain credit would follow these precedents.
A third principal cost is the loss of property by economically disadvan-
taged borrowers whose ventures fail.  As discussed, around half of start-up
small businesses fail.194  A borrower who loses her property in a foreclosure
may become homeless.  Even if the government provides a safety net,195 the
costs involved might run hundreds of millions of dollars more.
Overriding property law to enable the economically disadvantaged to
obtain credit also entails transaction costs.  These include the costs associated
with using satellite, drone, or other overhead imagery to document de facto
rights and costs associated with translating that into descriptions of allocated
boundaries.196  Even if these costs add up to tens of millions of dollars, they
would be relatively small compared to the two hundreds-of-million-dollars
cost estimates above.197
189 The law often regards partially aligned incentives as sufficient to mitigate moral
hazard concerns. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 1891–92 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11
(2012)) (requiring sponsors of securitization transactions to retain not less than five per-
cent of the credit risk on their transactions to help align incentives and reduce moral
hazard).
190 Article 4(3) of the Model Law thus provides that the “grant of a security interest in
de facto rights under this Law shall not include a security interest in the underlying de jure
rights if . . . (b) the value of such de facto rights is insignificant compared to the value of
such de jure rights.” Infra Annex, Model Law art. 4(3)(b).
191 See supra note 91.
192 See supra Part I.
193 See supra notes 82–91 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
195 See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of housing
allowances to help the disadvantaged obtain back-up housing if a loan default results in
seizure of their land).
196 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 184–86, 194–95.  If a government provides loan
guarantees, see supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text, there may be additional costs
which could vary depending on the loan sizes offered, the level of guarantee (e.g., fifty
percent or ninety percent), and the term of the loans. See, e.g., Allan L. Riding & George
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C. Balancing Costs and Benefits
The anticipated benefits of enabling the economically disadvantaged to
obtain credit are incalculably high, greatly helping to alleviate poverty
(thereby strengthening social stability) and also helping to foster economic
development (thereby strengthening financial stability).  Although the costs
might be many hundreds of millions of dollars, if not more, the benefits may
well exceed those costs.  In that case, this Article’s proposal—to enable the
economically disadvantaged to obtain credit by using their de facto rights as
collateral—would be economically efficient.  The fact that the benefits and
costs accrue to different parties—the benefits to the economically disadvan-
taged who hold de facto rights, the costs to the owners of the underlying de
jure rights—is irrelevant to this conclusion.  Economic efficiency is satisfied if
the overall benefits exceed the overall costs, regardless of who benefits and
who loses.198
Because its cost-benefit balancing is based on rough approximations,
this Article cannot—and does not purport to—conclude that its proposal is
in fact economically efficient.  Nonetheless, this Article’s approach to cost-
benefit balancing should provide a useful way of thinking about the econom-
ics of the proposal.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
  The analysis provides a conceptual framework to explain why the economi-
cally disadvantaged should be able to use their de facto rights as collateral to
obtain credit.  It also explains how to legally design such a framework.  Next
consider how to implement such a framework, comparing statutory and judi-
cial approaches.
Being primarily normative, this Article does not purport to comprehen-
sively address implementation.  Nonetheless, several observations may be
made.  As discussed, changing the law to enable the economically disadvan-
taged to use their homes and other commonly held assets as collateral would
have broad policy ramifications.199  Legislatures, which have the capacity to
hear multiple competing constituencies and to fully debate competing ideas,
should consider such fundamental changes.200
Legislatures are additionally well positioned to implement this Article’s
framework because it is technical and deals with a somewhat specialized area
of law—secured transactions.  Most ordinary judges are unlikely to have suffi-
cient commercial-law background to attempt to implement the framework.
Haines Jr., Loan Guarantees: Costs of Default and Benefits to Small Firms, 16 J. BUS. VENTURING
595, 602–06 (2001) (summarizing the default rates and costs of Canada’s small-business
loan program).
198 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
200 Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 29 (2016) (citing Robert Yalden, Canadian Mergers and Acquisitions at the
Crossroads: The Regulation of Defence Strategies After BCE, 55 CAN. BUS. L.J. 389, 410 (2014)).
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Moreover, judges that address fact-specific cases and controversies are highly
unlikely to have a sufficient mandate in any given case to implement the
entire framework.
These limited observations clearly favor a statutory approach.  To facili-
tate that approach, this Article, in the Annex, proposes a Model Law that
could be considered as a basis for legislative enactment.201
This Article does not, however, necessarily exclude the option of judicial
implementation.  The law of adverse possession, for example, arose from
judicial precedents.202  If legislatures are not prepared to help the economi-
cally disadvantaged to use their property as collateral to obtain credit, judges
may wish to contemplate such law reform in appropriate cases.
CONCLUSION
Wealth inequality threatens social and financial stability.  Enabling the
poor to use their homes as collateral to obtain credit and start small busi-
nesses could greatly reduce that inequality.  However, the poor cannot use
their homes as collateral because they have de facto rights but lack recorded
title.  This is a global problem: seventy percent of the world’s population
lacks registered title to their homes.203  It is also a national problem, espe-
cially for members of rural African American communities.
The efforts to solve this problem have failed because, among other rea-
sons, they focus on trying to transform property law, which is tightly bound to
tradition and protecting vested ownership.  This Article proposes an innova-
tive solution: using commercial law, instead of property law, to recognize
those de facto rights as collateral.  This follows modern commercial law’s
increasing recognition of important policy goals and commercial realities as
a basis to override outmoded property-law limitations.
Using commercial law to recognize those de facto rights as collateral
would help to empower the poor with credit, reducing the wealth gap.  It also
would create incentives for the private sector to finance sustainable growth,
advancing a major policy goal because the investment challenge of sustaina-
ble growth is beyond the capacity of the public sector alone.
201 In the United States, the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission,
which promulgate model commercial law for consideration and enactment by individual
state legislatures, see supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text, should also consider the
Model Law.
202 See supra notes 82–84 (observing that the roots of adverse possession come from the
English common-law rule of disseisin).  For an analysis showing that extending adverse pos-
session law more widely would be a poor alternative to this Article’s proposal, see supra
notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
203 Why Secure Land Rights Matter, supra note 13.
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ANNEX: MODEL LAW TO RECOGNIZE DE FACTO PROPERTY RIGHTS
Preamble
The shrinking middle class and the widening gap between the wealthy
and the economically disadvantaged create threats to social and financial sta-
bility.  The lack of credit significantly increases that wealth gap.
Although credit is essential to economic growth and upward mobility,
many economically disadvantaged people cannot obtain credit.  Because they
live in homes built on land that is not legally recorded as their property or
they otherwise hold property in which they have de facto but not de jure
rights, they cannot use that land or other property as collateral.
This Law facilitates the ability of the economically disadvantaged to use
certain de facto rights as collateral, in order to obtain credit.  It also thereby
creates incentives for the private sector to help finance sustainable growth.
Chapter I: Scope, Interpretation, and Use of Terms
Article 1: Scope
(1) This Law applies to security interests in both personal property and
real property (real estate).
Article 2: Interpretation
(1) This law shall be liberally construed to reflect commercial realities.
(2) Nothing in this Law shall be interpreted to restrict the protections
otherwise available to borrowers under consumer lending or similar law.
Article 3: Use of Terms
For purposes of this Law, the following terms shall have the following
meanings:
(1) “borrower” means an economically disadvantaged person who bor-
rows money or otherwise obtains credit under this Law;
(2) “clear notice” means notice that is physically obvious and manifestly
clear, including without limitation posting no-trespassing signs, locking
doors, and/or blocking entry or access to property;
(3) “collateral” means property that is subject to a security interest;
(4) “de facto rights” means rights—including those recognized or
respected in practice—associated with using property or excluding the use of
property by others, to the extent such rights are not formally recognized or
respected under official law;
(5) “economically disadvantaged” means lacking sufficient money or
other resources to live at a standard considered comfortable or normal in a
society;
(6) “security agreement” means a contract granting a security interest
under this Law.
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(7) “security interest” means a charge against or an interest in property
to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation;
(8) “underlying de jure rights” means rights that are formally recog-
nized or respected under official law, to property in which a third party has
de facto rights.
Chapter II: Creation of Security Interest
Article 4: Creating the Security Interest
(1) Economically disadvantaged persons shall have the right to grant a
security interest in their de facto rights as collateral, in order to obtain credit.
Such right ordinarily shall be evidenced by a security agreement.
(2) Except as provided in subpart (3) below, the grant of such a security
interest shall be deemed also to include a security interest in the underlying
de jure rights.
(3) The grant of a security interest in de facto rights under this Law
shall not include a security interest in the underlying de jure rights if (a) at
any time within the 90-day period prior to the grant of a security interest in
such de facto rights, there exists clear notice of the intent of the owner (pro-
vided such owner is not a governmental entity) of the underlying de jure
rights to preserve such de jure rights, or (b) the value of such de facto rights
is insignificant compared to the value of such de jure rights.
(4) Except as otherwise specifically permitted in Article 4(3), notice
thereunder shall not impair the de facto rights of any economically disadvan-
taged person.
(5) Any reasonable determination made by a lender in good faith and
contemporaneous with the grant of a security interest that the borrower is
economically disadvantaged shall be conclusive evidence thereof.
(6) As appropriate to obtain credit, or to obtain credit on better terms
and conditions, borrowers under this Law shall have the right to borrow on a
joint and several basis.204  References to a borrower shall then mean such
borrowers collectively, being jointly and severally liable for repayment; and
references to collateral shall then mean all such borrowers’ collateral collec-
tively securing the credit.
Article 5: Describing the Collateral
(1) The collateral shall be described in the security agreement.
(2) Such description of collateral shall allocate the relevant de facto
rights within the underlying de jure rights using any reasonable method.
(3) The following shall be deemed to constitute a reasonable method of
allocation.  Either the government, a nongovernmental organization, or a
local neighborhood association organizes persons residing on the underlying
204 [This enables borrowers to manage transaction costs and could be especially useful
for multiple borrowers who collectively start a business. See supra notes 161–63 and accom-
panying text.]
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de jure rights to allocate their de facto property rights by setting flags or
other visible markers at the boundaries, which satellite or other overhead
imagery would then document for translation into a description of those allo-
cated boundaries.
(4) The allocation shall be transcribed to a searchable government
record, located at [name of governmental record office].
(5) Lenders may conclusively rely on the validity and enforceability of
collateral descriptions that comply with this Article 5.
Chapter III: Perfection of Security Interest
Article 6: Creating Perfection
(1) A description of collateral filed with [name of governmental mort-
gage-recording office] shall constitute perfection of the security interest cre-
ated under this Law.
Article 7: Describing the Collateral
(1) Such description shall be deemed to be sufficient if it provides
notice that the collateral may be subject to a security interest under this Law.
(2) A standard description of the underlying de jure rights in which the
security interest is allocated shall be deemed to constitute a sufficient descrip-
tion.  This description could copy the existing recorded description of the
underlying de jure rights; it need not describe the allocated rights per se.
Chapter IV: Foreclosure on Security Interest
Article 8: Foreclosure
(1) Upon default by the borrower under a security agreement, the
lender shall have the right to exercise remedies against the collateral to the
extent provided after default under otherwise applicable secured transac-
tions law.
(2) To the extent the grant of a security interest is deemed, under Arti-
cle 4 of this Law, also to include a security interest in the underlying de jure
rights, the lender’s remedies under Article 8(1) shall extend to those under-
lying de jure rights.205
Chapter V: Government Assistance206
Article 9: Government Guarantees
(1) At its option, [name of government agency] may guarantee repay-
ment of all or a portion of any loans made under this Law.
205 [The Model Law could also give holders of the underlying de jure rights a profit-
sharing upside potential in the business started by the borrower, to help to balance the risk
that holders could lose their rights in a foreclosure. See supra note 91].
206 [Chapter V is an optional part of the Law.]
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(2) Such a guarantee may be made on whatever terms and conditions
[name of government agency] deems appropriate from time to time.207
Article 10: Government Loans
(1) At its option, [name of government agency] may make direct loans
under this Law.
(2) Such a loan may be made on whatever terms and conditions [name
of government agency] deems appropriate from time to time.208
207 [These terms and conditions might include profit sharing. See supra note 154.]
208 [Again, these terms and conditions might include profit sharing. See id.]
